I am very grateful to Kluwer Academic Publishers for the opportunity to republish these articles about knowledge and language. The Introduction to the volume has been written by James Logue, and I need to pay a very sincerely intended tribute to the care and professionalism which he has devoted to every feature of its production. My thanks are also due to Matthew MeG rattan for his technical as sistance in scanning the articles onto disk and formatting them. 1. Jonathan (...) class='Hi'>Cohen vii Publisher's Note Thanks are due to the following publishers for permission to reproduce the articles in this volume. On the project of a universal character. Oxford University Press. Paper 1 On a concept of a degree of grammaticalness. Logique et Analyse. Paper 2 Paper 3 The semantics of metaphor. Cambridge University Press. Paper 4 Can the logic of indirect discourse be formalised? The Association for Symbolic Logic. Paper 5 Some remarks on Grice's views about the logical particles of natural language. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Paper 6 Can the conversationalist hypothesis be defended? Kluwer Academic Publishers. Paper 7 How is conceptual innovation possible? Kluwer Academic Publishers. Should natural language definitions be insulated from, or interactive Paper 8 with, one another in sentence composition? Kluwer Academic Publish ers. Paper 9 A problem about truth-functional semantics. Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd. Paper 10 The individuation of proper names. Oxford University Press. Paper 11 Some comments on third world epistemology. Oxford University Press. Paper 12 Guessing. The Aristotelian Society. (shrink)

This article focuses on the relationship between social movements and political parties in the context of populist challenges to constitutional democracy. There are many reasons for the current plight of democracy but I focus here on one aspect: the decline of mainstream political parties, the emergence of new forms of populist movement parties and the general crisis of political representation in long consolidated Western democracies. This article analyses the specific political logic and dynamics of social movements – the logic of (...) influence, and distinguishes it from that of political parties – the logic of power. It addresses transformations in movements, parties and their relationships. It looks at the shifts in movement and party types that constitute the political opportunity structure for the emergence of new populist movement party forms and relationships, focusing on the hollowing out and movement-ization of political parties. Contemporary populist movement parties are not the cause of the hollowing out or movement-ization of political parties. Rather they are a response to the crisis of political representation exemplified by hollow parties and cartel parties. But it is my thesis that thanks to its specific logic, populism fosters the worst version of movement party relationships, undermining the democratic functions of both. (shrink)

No one nowadays would deny the importance of conceptual innovation in the growth of scientific knowledge. But how is it possible? And by this I do not mean: what kinds of social, economic, or mental develop- ments are causally responsible for promoting it? That is a question for historians, sociologists and psychologists of science to answer. Instead I shall concern myself with a more philosophical issue, namely: how can the possibility of conceptual innovation be compatible with the way in which (...) we reason about language, meaning and understanding - i.e., what adjustments in, or constraints on, the framework of such reasoning are forced on us by acceptance of this possibility? In particular does it fit in with the project of reconstructing scientific reasoning in artificial languages like Leibniz proposed in the 17th century or Carnap in the 20th? (shrink)

(Tye 2006) presents us with the following scenario: John and Jane are both stan- dard human visual perceivers (according to the Ishihara test or the Farnsworth test, for example) viewing the same surface of Munsell chip 527 in standard conditions of visual observation. The surface of the chip looks “true blue” to John (i.e., it looks blue not tinged with any other colour to John), and blue tinged with green to Jane.¹ Tye then in effect poses a multiple choice question.

The tapestry of Wilfrid Sellars’s writings is dauntingly rich in stimulus and suggestion. I shall take up here an intriguing strand of thought that was woven into one of his early papers ‘Language, Rules and Behavior’, and I shall discuss some of the issues to which it gives rise. Sellars was concerned in that paper with the procedures by which people evaluate actions as right or wrong, arguments as valid or invalid, and cognitive claims as well or ill grounded. He (...) sought to map out a true vïa media, in his treatment of such procedures, between rationalistic apriorism and what, for want of a better term then, he called ‘descriptivism’, by which he understood the claim that all meaningful concepts and problems belong to the empirical or descriptive sciences, including the sciences of human behaviour. Sellars was thus led to ask not only ‘What sort of a thing is justification?’ but also ‘How do we come to accept the rules or laws that license justifications?’ And he saw these questions as arising in relation to any dialogue in which one party seeks to justify something to another. With regard to the justification of actions he held that the intuitionism of Ross, Prichard and Ewing was reasonably faithful to the phenomenology of moral thought and experience, though he did not agree with their belief in a nonnatural quality or relation that may belong to actions over and above their empirical characteristics. With regard to the justification of predictions he held that the relevant covering laws are ultimately rendered acceptable by an appeal to instances of their application. But he was reluctant to conceive this kind of appeal as an inductive procedure. Instead he called it an application of Socratic method, since the purpose of this method is to make explicit the rules that we have implicitly adopted for thought and action, and Sellars interpreted our judgments to the effect that A causally necessitates B as the expression of a rule governing our use of the terms ‘A’ and ‘B’: science consists in the attempt, by remodeling human language, to develop a system of rule-governed behaviour which will adjust the human organism to the environment. (shrink)

Recent interest in the problem of verisimilitude stemmed originally from Popper's desire to provide a non-inductive criterion of merit that will select between two false theories) But the problem has also been taken up by others who are not committed to Popper's anti-inductivism. Indeed Ilkka Niiniluoto has argued that the estimated degree of truthlikeness of a generalisation g which is compatible with evidence e can be equated with the inductive probability of g on e, wherever g is a constituent in (...) Hintikka's sense. It might therefore be worth while to approach the problem afresh, in order to determine quite generally whether a measure of verisimilitude is what is principally needed for the evaluation of scientific progress. I shall argue that it is not. (shrink)

Ferdinand Schoeman (1986) attempts to refute six arguments that I gave in The Probable and the Provable (1977, pp. 49-120) for not analyzing the standards of forensic proof in terms of any concept of probability that conforms to the familiar principles of the mathematical calculus of chance. But he evidently does not appreciate the strength of the case for rejecting the validity of any such analysis. In the course of discussing his criticisms, I shall add a seventh argument to fortify (...) my position, though I concede that the second of my original arguments has to be discarded. (shrink)

There is a certain dominant tradition, school, ambiance or intellectual community in contemporary philosophy of science which can conveniently be labelled logical empiricism. Now a curious and (I believe) hitherto unremarked change occurred in the accepted methodology of logical empiricism shortly after the end of World War II. Before then accepted forms of argument for philosophical theses about the logic, analysis, or rational reconstruction of science fell into two main categories. Some arguments appealed to familiar or historically attestable facts about (...) the development of science, the declared aims of scientists, etc. in certain areas. Others appealed to criteria of generality, clarity, accuracy, consistency, simplicity, and similar considerations of a systematic nature in the construction of philosophical analyses. Appeals were rarely, if ever, made at that time to intuition. If an intuitive idea was mentioned at all, it was mentioned as something that might suggest a starting-point of enquiry but could not be relied upon, even presumptively, as the ground for a conclusion. But this situation changed markedly from the late '40's onwards. Many arguments came to be rested, quite explicitly, on the alleged intuitive acceptability of certain premisses. In the Carnapian school, for example, the guiding objective of an inductive logician seems no longer to be the rational reconstruction of scientific reasoning but rather the axiomatisation of his own intuitions by the most sophisticated methods available. (shrink)

This article argues that understanding the dangers and risks of authoritarian populism in consolidated constitutional democracies requires analysis of the forms of pluralism and status anxieties that emerge in civil and economic society, in a context of profound political, socioeconomic, and cultural change. This paper has two basic theses. The first is that when societies become deeply divided, and segmental pluralism maps onto affective party political polarization, generalized social solidarity is imperiled, as is commitment to democratic norms, social justice, and (...) liberal democratic constitutionalism. The second, is that populist political entrepreneurs excel in fomenting social antagonisms by framing shifts in the forms of social pluralism in ways that foster deep political polarization, generalized distrust and a politics of resentment against “elites,” “the establishment,” “the oligarchy,” and “outsiders.” Why populist offers resonate requires a social theoretical analysis of status/solidarity and class issues and a direct response to them. I draw on Polanyi and Habermas to develop an explanatory approach to the current crisis and the populist responses it triggers. I navigate between two inadequate approaches: that of the Hofstadter consensus school which construes status concerns and populism as retrograde, anti-modern, paranoid and meriting no direct response; and that of the neo-Marxist tradition that acknowledges the mobilizing power of “cultural factors” and status anxieties but deems them to be epiphenomena of the deeper story of economic distributive injustice. I reject this assessment and seek to take up the status/solidarity issues in ways that take them seriously, challenge populist framing and provide alternative direct responses to them. I reject the narrative frames of left populists who foment polarization and I try to present an alternative narrative framing for a future democratic politics that draws on the best in politically liberal, constitutionalist, democratic, and socialist traditions. (shrink)

As Professor Ziegler’s article and prior books show, the reversal of Roe v. Wade has been an overarching goal of the abortion-restrictive movement. With that goal approaching—indeed if the l...

This article engages with Cristina Lafont’s excellent book, Democracy without Shortcuts. I argue that she provides us with the tools to comprehend what democracy entails and how to challenge the populist pseudo-democratic project.

This article discusses the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, an important political thinker and theorist of democracy. Castoriadis developed not one but two theories of democracy based on two distinct understandings of autonomy. The first is compatible with the key features of representative government; the second is not. Unfortunately, Castoriadis models his interpretation of the idea of popular sovereignty on the second view, thereby concluding, like Rousseau before him, that it is incompatible with representative government. This article discusses both approaches and (...) presents a reinterpretation of political representation and of the idea of popular sovereignty in order to show how they can be made compatible. I argue that the discourse of popular sovereignty and the modern principles of representative government entail one another. (shrink)

This article defends the principle of non-establishment against 21st-century projects of political religion, constitutional theocracy and political theology. It is divided into two parts. The first part, published in special issue 39.4–5 of Philosophy and Social Criticism, proceeds by constructing an ideal type of political secularism, and then discussing the innovative American model of constitutional dualism regarding religion that combined constitutional protection for the freedom of religious conscience and exercise with the principle of non-establishment. It then critically assesses the integrationist (...) approach –disguised as a concern for pluralism and fairness – as an alternative to this framework. The integrationist approach challenges ‘separation’ and political secularism in a subtle attack on the non-establishment principle, aimed at drastically narrowing its scope. Successes of this approach in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and politics, have triggered a response by liberal egalitarians. I address this response – the equal liberty model – in this second part, arguing that although on the right track, it fails to find a middle ground between political secularism and integration. Instead, by abandoning the discourse of separation, it plays into populist integrationist hands without delivering on the promise of providing a coherent standard for deciding cases. The article proposes a third approach, one that does not throw out the non-establishment baby with the strict separationist bathwater and that wholeheartedly endorses political secularism, a sine qua non for 21st-century constitutional democracy. Equal liberty properly construed can help provide criteria for determining when an accommodation, a regulation or no regulation of religion by the state is appropriate. But it must be supplemented by other values – democratic and civil republican. The article concludes with a typology of the forms of regulation that are warranted under the conditions of the contemporary regulatory state, now the target and prize of politicized religion. (shrink)

European animal disease policy seems to find its justification in a “harm to other” principle. Limiting the freedom of animal keepers—e.g., by culling their animals—is justified by the aim to prevent harm, i.e., the spreading of the disease. The picture, however, is more complicated. Both during the control of outbreaks and in the prevention of notifiable, animal diseases the government is confronted with conflicting claims of stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed by each other, and who ask (...) for government intervention. In this paper, we first argue that in a policy that aims to prevent animal diseases, the focus shifts from limiting “harm” to weighing conflicting claims with respect to “risks of harm.” Therefore, we claim that the harm principle is no longer a sufficient justification for governmental intervention in animal disease prevention. A policy that has to deal with and distribute conflicting risks of harm needs additional value assumptions that guide this process of assessment and distribution. We show that currently, policies are based on assumptions that are mainly economic considerations. In order to show the limitations of these considerations, we use the interests and position of keepers of backyard animals as an example. Based on the problems they faced during and after the recent outbreaks, we defend the thesis that in order to develop a sustainable animal disease policy other than economic assumptions need to be taken into account. (shrink)

En même temps qu'il est réputé pour son scepticisme linguistique, Kant reconnaît aux pronoms personnels une signification universelle. C'est ce statut d'exception qui éclaire le caractère décisif de l'usage de ces pronoms dans la critique kantienne du cogito. On peut faire apparaître un paradoxe immanent à cet usage au coeur de l'opération de désubstantialisation de la pensée, engagée par Kant dans la Déduction transcendantale et dans les Paralogismes: d'une part, la substitution des pronoms il et ça au pronom je dans (...) le fameux «je pense» permet la réduction de la pensée à sa stricte fonction logique mais, d'autre part, le jeu de substitution des pronoms n'entame pas la fonction d'instanciation d'un sujet "fût-il strictement grammatical" de la pensée dans la formulation du cogito. Cette tension paradoxale entre un sujet désubstantialisé et une «subjectivité», certes neutralisée mais restée néanmoins instanciée dans l'acte de penser, s'accuse dans la deuxième édition de la Critique de la raison pure, qui invente à partir du cogito une nouvelle catégorie d'existence. Kant semble ainsi poser une pierre d'attente pour une nouvelle conception de la subjectivité de la pensée, que nous nommons «le fait-sujet de la pensée responsable» et qui implique une pensée inédite de la constitution du je dans et par la puissance d¿interpellation de la raison. Cette analyse permet une relectura du premier paragraphe de l'Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique, elle conduit à reconsidérer de manière critique l'interprétation que donne Jacques Derrida du sujet kantien de la pensée dans L'animal que donc je suis et elle inaugure peut-être une nouvelle conception du sujet responsable. Though known for his linguistic scepticism, Kant grants a universal meaning to personal pronouns. It is this exception which accounts for the decisive role that the use of personal pronouns plays in the kantian criticism of the cogito. It can be shown that a paradox inherent to this use emerges at the core of the thought-desubstancializing operation developed by Kant in the Trascendental deduction and the Paralogisms: on one hand, the substitution of the pronoun "I" for the pronouns "he" and "it" in the famous "I think" allows the reduction of thought to its strict logical function, but, on the other hand, the play of pronoun substitution does not prevent the subject of thought "even tough strictly grammatical" from being instanciated in the formula of the cogito. This paradoxical strain between a desubstancialized subject and a "subjectivity" neutralized but nonetheless still instantiated in the act of thinking is to be noted in the second edition of the Critique of pure reason, which derives from the cogito a new category of existence. It seems, therefore, that Kant lays the first ground for a new conception of the subjectivity of thought, which we call "the fact-subject of responsible thought" and which implies a novel notion of the constitution of the "I" in and through the addressing force of reason. This analysis allows for a new understanding of the first paragraph of the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, leads us to critically re-consider Jacques Derrida's interpretation of the kantian subject of thought in L'animal que donc je suis , and initiates perhaps a new conception of responsible subject. (shrink)

Access to investigational drugs is a concern to patients and regulatory agencies. In order to determine potential trial participants’ views on access to investigational drugs, we surveyed one hundred people who had been referred to a phase I clinical trial. Most respondents indicated that patients had a right to investigational drugs, that the drugs should be offered only in the context of research, that getting access to these drugs is too hard, and that knowing the right people and being persistent (...) increased the likelihood of gaining access. Respondents did not think that investigational drugs should be given to anyone who wanted them, or that physicians were aware of the latest investigational agents. They most frequently recommended two allocation criteria: offering investigational drugs to those who would benefit most or were most needy; and allocating them to maximize scientific advancement. Respondents who understood the purpose of the trial were more likely to choose the second criterion. (shrink)

The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. (...) To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. PAUL K. FEYERABEND ROBERT S. COHEN MARX W. WARTOFSKY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII JOHN WORRALL / Imre Lakatos : Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science JOSEPH AGASSI / The Lakatosian Revolution 9 23 D. M. ARMSTRONG / Immediate Perception w. W. BAR TLEY, III/On Imre Lakatos 37 WILLIAM BERKSON / Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An Appreciation 39 I. B. COHEN / William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution 55 L. JONATHAN COHEN / How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? 65 R. S. COHEN / Constraints on Science 79 GENE D'AMOUR/ Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics 87 YEHUDA ELKANA / Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science 99 PA UL K. (shrink)

Abe and his friend Sol are out for a walk together in a part of town they haven't been in before. Passing a Christian church, they notice a curious sign in front that says "$1,000 to anyone who will convert." "I wonder what that's about," says Abe. "I think I'll go in and have a look. I'll be back in a minute; just wait for me." Sol sits on the sidewalk bench and waits patiently for nearly half an hour. Finally, (...) Abe reappears. "Well," asks Sol, "what are they up to? Who are they trying to convert? Why do they care? Did you get the $1,000?" Indignantly Abe replies, "Money. That's all you people care about." Ted Cohen thinks that's not a bad joke. But he also doesn't think it's an easy joke. For a listener or reader to laugh at Abe's conversion, a complicated set of conditions must be met. First, a listener has to recognize that Abe and Sol are Jewish names. Second, that listener has to be familiar with the widespread idea that Jews are more interested in money than anything else. And finally, the listener needs to know this information in advance of the joke, and without anyone telling him or her. Jokes, in short, are complicated transactions in which communities are forged, intimacy is offered, and otherwise offensive stereotypes and cliches lose their sting—at least sometimes. _Jokes_ is a book of jokes and a book about them. Cohen loves a good laugh, but as a philosopher, he is also interested in how jokes work, why they work, and when they don't. The delight at the end of a joke is the result of a complex set of conditions and processes, and Cohen takes us through these conditions in a philosophical exploration of humor. He considers questions of audience, selection of joke topics, the ethnic character of jokes, and their morality, all with plenty of examples that will make you either chuckle or wince. _Jokes:_ more humorous than other philosophy books, more philosophical than other humor books. "Befitting its subject, this study of jokes is... light, funny, and thought-provoking.... [T]he method fits the material, allowing the author to pepper the book with a diversity of jokes without flattening their humor as a steamroller theory might. Such a book is only as good as its jokes, and most of his are good.... [E]ntertainment and ideas in one gossamer package."—_Kirkus Reviews_ "One of the many triumphs of Ted Cohen's Jokes-apart from the not incidental fact that the jokes are so good that he doesn't bother to compete with them-is that it never tries to sound more profound than the jokes it tells.... [H]e makes you feel he is doing an unusual kind of philosophy. As though he has managed to turn J. L. Austin into one of the Marx Brothers.... Reading Jokes makes you feel that being genial is the most profound thing we ever do-which is something jokes also make us feel-and that doing philosophy is as natural as being amused."—Adam Phillips, _London Review of Books_ "[A] lucid and jargon-free study of the remarkable fact that we divert each other with stories meant to make us laugh.... An illuminating study, replete with killer jokes."—Kevin McCardle, _The Herald_ "Cohen is an ardent joke-maker, keen to offer us a glimpse of how jokes are crafted and to have us dwell rather longer on their effects."—Barry C. Smith, _Times Literary Supplement_ "Because Ted Cohen loves jokes, we come to appreciate them more, and perhaps think further about the quality of good humor and the appropriateness of laughter in our lives."—Steve Carlson, _Christian Science Monitor_. (shrink)

This paper addresses the following three claims that Frankfurt makes about the concept of bullshit:1. Bullshit requires the intention to deceive others.2. Bullshit does not constitute lying.3. The essence of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says.I offer counterexamples to all three claims. By way of defending my counterexamples, I examine Cohen’s distinction between bullshiting and bullshit and argue that my examples are indeed cases of bullshiting that Frankfurt’s analysis is intended to cover. My (...) examples of bullshitters who are very concerned to say only things that are true show that Frankfurt is mistaken in claiming that the “essence” of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says. (shrink)

Nous avons voulu exposé, à partir du dernier texte de Fichte intitulé « L’Initiation à la Vie Bienheureuse », ce qu’il conviendrait d’appeler la question de I’humanisme. « Quel est I’être de I’humanisme? » est ainsi la question directrice qui a accompagnée notre lecture du texte de 1812. Nous avons tenté d’indiquer à la fois la racine chrétienne et I’origine philosophico-rationnelle de cet humanisme, en y relevant d’une part les allusions à Saint Jean et en soulevant la notion centrale du (...) sacrifice, tout en maintenant la référence constante à la mouvance et à l’exigence scientifique du philosopher. En contre-poids à cette définition christiano-philosophique de I’humanisme, il nous a semblé necessaire de faire intervenir Lévinas, qui s’efforce de reformuler, ou de réinventer, face à cette tradition philosophique, la question de I’humanisme. Cette reformulation, cette réinvention, s’inscrivant manifestement dans la tradition hébraïque, tâche d’offrir une alternative à la logique sacrificielle de I’humanisme fichtéen, en orientant I’humain non plus vers sa « destination suprême en tant qu’humain » mais vers son « éveil - sans-destination, sans-vocation - à la responsabilité pour Autrui ».We wish to expose,from Fichte’s last text entitled “The way towards the blessed life”, what should be called the question of humanism. “What is the essence of humanism?” is thus the main question that guided our reading of the text from 1812. We have attempted to point out the Christian roots as weIl as the philosophical-rational origin of this humanism by gathering references to Saint John, and by raisingthe central notion of sacrifice, while constantly alluding to the mobility and the scientific exigency of the act of philosophizing. In order to counterbalance this Christian-philosophic definition of humanism, in seemed necessary to us to call in Levinas, who endeavours to reformulate, or to reinvent, in the face of this philosophical tradition, the question of humanism. This reformulation, this reinvention, manifestly in line with Hebraic tradition, seeks to offer an alternative to the sacrificial logic of the Fichtean humanism by orienting Humans no longer towards their “supreme destination qua Humans”, but towards their “awakening - with no destination, no calling - to the responsibility for the Other”. (shrink)

I will critically explore Arato and Cohen’s work on populism acknowledging areas of agreement while noting gaps in their reasoning particularly regarding the complex relations between capitalism and democracy and the recent erosion of democracy replacing it with authoritarian regimes that are better suited for neoliberal policies.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:468 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY explanation of this in terms of "Aristotelian" categories is not Plotinus at his most convincing. Certainly Aristotle could not possibly have accepted the use of the categories of potentiality and actuality that O'Daly finds at VI. 2.20.20ff., and it is difficult to see how anyone could regard as seriously illuminatinga solution in which there is a "reciprocal" relationship between part (or particular) and whole such (...) that the whole is potentially the part, which is, actually, while simultaneously the part is potentially the whole, which is, actually. Throughout, O'Daly strives to avoid obscurantistic appeals in explicating Plotinus's thought. As typical of his approach I would cite his philological solution of the puzzling passage at V. 1.7.4-6 where Plotinus seems either to claim that the One produces intelligence by intelligence's acting in a certain way, or uncharacteristicallyto attribute thought to the One. Plotinus is not asking, O'Daly claims, how the One produces nous, but rather how it is that what is produced is nous. The solution is both neat and clear. I was disappointed, for this reason, with the concluding lines of the book. O'Daly is determined, as we have seen, to find the self preserved in the mystical union with the One. Unable to find this in Plotinus's characterization of the self in terms of nous orpsych~ he turns to the One itself to find a clue, for the One is an egregious instance of self. The move renders "selfhood, for Plotinus... in strict contrast to individuality" (p. 91), which is perplexing enough in view of O'Daly's previous stress on the identity of the self at its various levels. But it also provides him with the concept of epibol~, the "simple intuitive approach to Itself" (p. 93) that characterizes the One at VI. 7. 38. 10-39ff. and is used to characterize the approach to the One at III. 8.9. 20ff. O'Daly seizes on this concept to provide a perfectly obscure solution to his problem in these mysterious concluding words: "The term epibol~ links the two passages [III. 8.9 and VI. 7. 38]: both seem to corroborate the assertions that, on the one hand, the One is a Self, and, on the other, that, of the faculty experiencing unio, we can say no more than that it is--'the self'"(p. 94). O'Daly is forced to this pass, 1 believe, by his taking the mystical experience as too central in Plotinus's thought, as the cornerstone of his system, while, in reality, the heart of this system lies in the intelligible realm and its ties to the phenomenal. The union with the super-real, I suggest, serves only to indicate to the individual that he has overreached himself and needs, in good Platonic fashion, to return to the realm of intelligibility,that realm of nous and soul that O'Daly has spent the bulk of his time usefully examining. JEROME P. SCHILLER Washington University Descartes. By Jonathon R6e. (New YOrk: Pica Press, 1975. Pp. 204) Like the Discours de la m~thode, this is an "elegant essay," clear, condensed, and orderly. It analyzes in brief the Cartesian system of philosophy, pointing out that Descartes's approach to science was philosophical, although his philosophy was an attempt to discover the most scientific forms of description. And science for this "nouveau philosophe" was not qualitative but quantitative. The book furnishes an antidote to the myth popularized by Voltaire that misrepresents Descartes as an unscientific rationalizer whose fantastic physics was entirely superseded by Newton's. "The habit of classifying thinkers into warring schools," warns the author, "has resulted in a completely mistaken image of Descartes" (p. 13). Newtonian physics R6e sees as in the Cartesian tradition. After an analytical table of contents, ~t la Descartes, the book starts with a one-page chronological table, from which one regrettably misses the Cogitationes privatae, the Recherche de la v~rit~ par la lumi~re naturelle, the Primae cogitationes circa generationem animalium, and the Trait6 des passions de l'ame. A brief introduction is followed by sixteen short chapters and two appendices. The first appendix... (shrink)

Je lui ai associÉ un court extrait d'une revue de questions portant sur le même thème. Implicit memory is revealed when previous experiences facilitate perf on a task that does not require conscious or intentional recollection of those expces. Explicit memory is revealed when perf on a task requires conscious recolelction of previous expces. Il s'agit de defs descriptives qui n'impliquent pas l'existence de deux systs de mÉmo sÉparÉs. Historiquement Descartes est le premier ˆ faire mention de phÉnomènes de mÉmo (...) implicites, Leibniz, Maine de Biran, Bergson en ont Également parlÉ. Korsakoff (1889) avec ses travaux sur les amnÉsiques montre qu'ils sont capables d'utiliser de l'info qu'ils ont acquises dans des Épisodes rÉcents sans pour autant manifester le moindre souvenir de l'Épisode. L'interprÉtation de ces phÉnomènes Était alors que ça renvoyait ˆ des traces en mÉmoire trop tÉnues pour accèder jusqu'au champ de la conscience. Cette interprÉtation va pouvoir être ÉcartÉe par les travaux rÉcents. Thorndike a Également conduit un nbre important de travaux sur MI. Les trauvaux un peu plus rÉcents ont montrÉ qu'un apprentissage antÉrieur pouvait faciliter une perfce sans qu'il y ait ref explicite à l'Épisode d'apprentissage. On a montrÉ aussi l'effet de stimuli subliminaux, qui en tant que tels ne peuvent pas être rappelÉs consciemment, mais qui influencent la conduite ou les jugts ultÉrieurs. Par ex, la prÉsentation de formes sur des temps très courts qui excluent la possibilitÉ d'une perception consciente influence significativement lechoix de formes dans une pÉreuve ultÉrieure de choix forcÉs où les sjts doivent indiquer la forme qu'il prÉfère entre deux. Ils choisissent prÉfÉrentiellement celles qui leur ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉes de manière subliminale. De même Bargh et al. ont montrÉ que des sjts soumis de manière subliminale ˆ des mots hostiles portent ultÉrieurement des jugts plus nÉgatifs sur une personne target. Il ya Également eu des travaux sur l'apprsge ou le condt without awareness en particulier apprsge implicite de règles de grammaire (ie le sjt peut construire de nouvelles phrases conformes ˆ la syntaxe de celles qui lui ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉes sans pour autant petre capables d'noncer les règles de grammaire qu'il utilise) Rem: N'est ce pas un pbe de typemÉtacognition??? Enfin, tous les travaux sur le priming sont des elts en faveur de MI: Facilitation in the processing of a stimulus as a function of a recent encounter with the same stimulus. Type de perfce sur lesquels les effets de priming ont ÉtÉ dÉmontrÉs: -T‰ches de dÉcision lexicale: Le sjt doit dire si la cha"ne de caractères qu'on lui prÉsente est un mot ou pas: Le temps de latence est beaucoup plus court si la cha"ne a dÉjˆ ÉtÉ prÉsentÉe une première fois. -Mesures de temps d'identification de mots en rpÉsentation tachitoscopiques -ComplÉmentation de mots: les sjts ont tendance ˆ complÉter pour crÉer les mots qui leur ont ÉtÉ prÉsentÉs antÉrieurement. L'intÉrêt pour le paradigme de priming se retouve chez les gens qui s'intÉressent ˆ: -reconnaissance de mots et organisation lexicale. les effets de priming permettent de faire des hyps sur l'accès lexical et la reprÉsentation. -M. Épisodique: travux sur les amnÉsiques qui ne se souviennent pas qu'on vient de leur prÉsenter des mots mais qui manifestent une mÉmoire implicite lorsqu'on leur fait faire de la complÉmentation de mots. DISSOCIATION ENTRE M.I. ET M EXPLICITE 1-Si de nombreux travaux montrent que la M explicite est influencÉe par le travail d'Élaboration (profondeur de traitement) en jeu pendant la première phase d'Étude des stimuli, il semble que la MI ne le soit pas. 2-Le changt de modalitÉ (par ex auditif -> visuel) entre la phase d'Étude et la phase de test provoque une attÉnuation importante de l'effet de priming si le test est un test de MI mais pas si c'est un test de ME. 3-Les effets de primings persistent assez largement sur plusieurs jours ce qui n'est pas le cas des perfces ˆ une Épreuve de reconnaissance. 4-Les perfces sur des tests de MI ne semblent pas influencÉes par des manipulations d'interfÉrences proactives ou rÉtroactives dont on sait qu'elles influencent les perfces en ME. 5-Absce de corrÉlation entre perfces ˆ des tests de reconnaissance et perfces ˆ une Épreuve de complÉmentation de mots. SIMILARITES ENTRE PRIMING ET REMEMBERING 1- A certaines conditions les durÉes de rÉtention on des effets parallèles sur les effets de priming et les mesures de ME (REm: en partie contradictoire avec 3 ci dessus) 2-La manipulation du contexte de la liste lors de la phase d'Étude affecte ˆ la fois les perfces en reconnaissance et en identification de mots. 3- ME et MI sont influencÉes par des associations nouvellement acquises entre des paires de mots non reliÉes (Rem: contradictoires avec 4 ci dessus ??) 4- Rem: Le contraire de 1 du pt "dissociation" !!!! dans une manip particulière 5-Johnston et al. ont montrÉ que des mots identifÉs plus rapidement Étaient plus svt jugÉs comme 'old' dans une t‰che de reconnaissance que les mots identifiÉs plus lentement. Il n'est pas exclu que les phÉnomènes que l'on interprètent comme relevant de MI soient parfois de la ME involontaire cad des cas o les cues fournis dans le test conduisent ˆ un souvenir involontaire mais totalement conscient. LES INTERPRETATIONS THEORIQUES DE MI 1-Les effets de priming sur des test de MI sont attribuables ˆ l'activation temporaires de reprÉsentations ou structures de K prÉ-existantes . Cette activation est supposÉe avoir lieu de manière automatique, indÉpendamment des processus d'Élaboration nÉcessaires pour Établir de nouvelles traces Épisodiques. 2- les difÉrences entre ME et MI sont dues ˆ la nature et aux relations entre les processus d'encodage et de rÉcupÉration. Une version de cette approche est celle qui s'appuie sur la distinction entre processus dirigÉs par les donnÉes et processus dirigÉs par les concepts. Ces derniers reflètent des activitÉs initiÉes par le sjt comme l'Élaboration, l'organisation et la reconstruction, c'est sur ce type de processus que reposerait la ME alors que la MI reposerait sur des processus data-driven. 3-ME et MI renvoient ˆ des systs sous jacents diffÉrents. Pour Cohen & Squire (1984), la ME est supportÉe par une M DECLARATIVE , syst qui est en jeu dans la formation de nouvelles reprÉsentations. La MI repose sur un syst PROCEDURAL dans lequel la M se manifeste par des modifications on line de procÉdures ou opÉrations de traitement. Le syst de M Épisodique est vu comme la base pour le souvenir explicite d'evts rÉcents tandis que la M sÉmantique est responsable des perfces sur des tests de MI. Chacune de ces approches est conforme ˆ certaines des donnÉes recueillies mais pas ˆ d'autres. (shrink)

The need today, according to Cohen, is not for more criticism of old theories of induction but for new theories to criticize. In his recent book, he presents a new theory of induction in which he attempts to develop Bacon's seminal ideas "in a way that is not vitiated by obsession with the mathematical calculus of probabilities." Consequently, "induction" in the title would seem to refer to Baconian Induction, i.e. induction by variation of circumstances as distinct from induction by (...) enumeration. The author offers his book as an analysis of the logical syntax of "support" for such induction. He prefers the metaphor of "support" to Carnap's metaphor of "confirmation" since the former is spatial and the latter is temporal and "... inductive support is timeless support for timeless propositions...." The first six chapters, the bulk of the book, are philosophical in character, while the last chapter contains a formalization of a system of inductive logic based on C. I. Lewis. In the philosophical sections, the author proposes that induction as used in various fields, e.g. by the scientist or lawyer, does not differ in method or logical syntax but in subject-matter. For this reason, he finds it necessary to present a logical system of induction as a conclusion to the book. Cohen invites criticism of his new theory of induction. The present reviewer feels that the author has misunderstood Aristotelian induction. Aristotelian induction means, primarily, being led from one truth to another and not the enumeration of instances. Rhetorical example has, for Aristotle, the nature of induction. Furthermore, the author himself seems to introduce time as a factor when he assesses inductive support in legal reasoning. This seems inconsistent with "timeless support for timeless propositions." Cohen's new theory is one that is worth a critical examination.--L. A. (shrink)

In the “Critique of Pure Reason” and subsequent “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics...”, “Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science”, “Opus Postumum” Kant develops one of the modes of his transcendentalism, the metaphysics of possible experience, whose task is to study the transcendental conditions for the possibility of our (cognition), which, according to Kant, has a priori character. P. Strawson calls this mode of metaphysics ‘ descriptive metaphysics ’ and connects it with the analyzing the ‘conceptual structure’ of our thinking about the (...) world. The contemporary realistic trend (primarily within the framework of the analytical philosophical tradition) in the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is associated with the modern theory of “two aspects” (80s of the 20th century), which replaced the classical theory of “two objects/worlds” (compare also with the opposition “ theory of appearance vs. theory of appearances ”). Within the framework of this theory, the Kantian ‘appearance’ receives an objectified status, it is not our mental representation, but corresponds (as its signs) to really existing things, or Kantian ‘objects of experience’. The article traces the formation of the historical and conceptual background of the ‘ metaphysics of experience ’ (H. Paton's original expression). Historically, the metaphysics of experience inherits the neo-Kantian approach to interpreting Kant's transcendentalism as a ‘theory of experience’ (H. Cohen, E. Cassirer), then it develops in logical positivism/empiricism (H. Reichenbach, R. Carnap; further in post-posivivism: the theory of I. Lakatos and T. Kuhn), analytical philosophy of science (W. Sellars, G. Buchdal, H. Putnam), and at present the metaphysics of experience is developing in a number of contemporary works of an analytical orientation (P. Strawson, K. Ameriks, L. Allais and etc.). (shrink)

Although Mach insisted that he was a scientist, not a philosopher, many of his ideas were genuinely philosophical. This collection of essays indicates, among other matters of mathematical and scientific interest, how such ideas grew from Mach's work and something of their philosophical significance. In particular, discussions of Mach's experiments in aerodynamics and psychology show how he made physical phenomena observable and applied "causal" concepts to sensory processes. Having done this, Mach felt that he could hold a phenomenalism of neutral (...) elements which are neither subjective nor objective. He thought that a unified science could be based on such elements and that he would then no longer have to change his conceptual frame in going from one discipline to another, as from "atoms" to "mind" in going from physics to biology. Young Albert Einstein was deeply impressed by Mach's attitude toward fundamental concepts. One essay discusses the influence on Einstein's theory of general relativity of Mach's Principle, i.e., Mach's substitution of the concept of motion with respect to the distant stars for the unobservable Newtonian concept of motion with respect to absolute space. A discussion of Mach's own use of the atomic theory illustrates his attitude toward theories and suggests that he was able to reject the atom because this concept is not particularly useful in the fields with which he was primarily concerned. An essay by editor Cohen on the implications of Mach's theory of knowledge argues that a phenomenalism of neutral elements collapses into mysticism, i.e., into a submergence of the ego in the universal consciousness. Also interesting is Philipp Frank's classification of Mach as an "Enlightment" philosopher, or one who criticizes the abuse of concepts. Just as the men of the eighteenth century Enlightenment opposed theological concepts in physics, so Mach opposed physical concepts in biology, thereby clearing science of old error to make way for new truth. Some biographical data and an extensive bibliography are appended, as well as an index of proper names.--L. G. (shrink)

Justice, Luck, and Knowledge (JLK) contributes to recent developments in two areas, moral responsibility and distributive justice. Prominent luck‐neutralizing approaches to distributive justice, exemplified in work by Cohen and by Roemer, argue that justice requires equal distribution of goods for which people aren't responsible. Such views of justice haven't focused attention on responsibility itself. Meanwhile, responsibility has been illuminat‐ingly articulated in work including, and influenced by, Frankfurt's seminal essays. My book brings these separate lines of work, on justice and (...) on responsibility, into contact, examining how the new articulation of responsibility constrains the roles responsibility can play in distributive justice. Part I focuses on responsibility and its inverse correlate, luck; Part II assesses responsibility‐based approaches to justice in light of preceding arguments about responsibility. (See JLK, 4–5 on responsibility, reactive attitudes, and accountability.). (shrink)

L. Jonathan Cohen has written a number of important books and articles in which he argues that mathematical probability provides a poor model of much of what paradigmatically passes for sound reasoning, whether this be in the sciences, in common discourse, or in the law. In his book, The Probable and the Provable, Cohen elaborates six paradoxes faced by advocates of mathematical probability (PM) when treating issues of evidence as they would arise in a court of law. He (...) argues that his system of inductive probability (PI) satisfactorily handles the issues that proved paradoxical for mathematical probability, and consequently PI deserves to be thought of as an important standard of rational thinking. I argue that a careful look at each of the alleged paradoxes shows that there is no conflict between mathematical probability and the law, except when for reasons of policy we opt for values in addition to accuracy maximization. Recognizing the role of such policies provides no basis for questioning the adequacy of PM. The significance of this critical treatment of Cohen's work is that those interested in revising the laws of evidence to allow for more explicitly mathematical approaches ought to feel that such revisions will not violate the spirit of forensic rationality. (shrink)

Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of the informal distinctions involved in any one case may well conflict. Special attention is paid to the question of whether a (...) single notion of property is capable of supporting the various distinctions. (shrink)